Abstract: Although sometimes said to reflect distinctively Japanese modes of economic organization or the general importance of path-dependence and culture, the cross-shareholding patterns within the Japanese keiretsu often display a straightforward economic logic. When keiretsu banks trade on debtor stock, for example, they occasionally seem to be capturing gains from inside information. When manufacturers in the automobile industry buy stock in their suppliers, they apparently do so to protect relationship-specific investments. And when the pre-war predecessors to the keiretsu invested in component firms, they often invested in ways that resembled the ways silicon valley venture capitalists invest today. Economic form may differ between the U.S. and Japan, but the cross-shareholdings themselves reflect a simple economic rationale.
The Japanese keiretsu groups present something of a puzzle. They include many of Japan's largest and most prominent companies --the various Mitsubishi firms, for example, or the Sumitomo and Mitsui. At least as usually recounted, these firms both invest heavily in and trade heavily with each other. The puzzle is why.
In the U.S., we cite these intra-group trades and investments for a wide variety of propositions. Implicitly comparing them to spot-market transactions, some observers claim they reflect a distinctively Japanese preference for keeping social contacts within closed groups. 1 Others tie them to the current debates over path-dependence, and claim they prove history matters --that they illustrate the way Japan's isoloated evolution shaped its economic organization. For a time, some observers even called the keiretsu non-tariff trade barriers. 2 Yet in many (not all) ways, keiretsu firms invest and trade in ways that reflect a straightforward economic logic. In many ways, keiretsu firms buy and trade stock in each other in ways that represent rational responses either to investment opportunities or to the problems created by the Williamsonian (1985: 61) "fundamental transformation" in contract --rational responses to the potential for strategic behavior in a world of asymmetric information and relationship-specific investments.
Contractual form may differ between the U.S. and Japan, in short, but the basic logic by which firms exploit investment opportunities or solve the problems posed by informational 1 Sociologist Michael Gerlach (1992: 4) locates the difference between U.S. and Japanese business reltaions in the "pervasiveness and continuing visibility" of "affiliational ties," "long-term relationships," "multiplexity," "extended networks," and "symbolic signiication" within the group networks. asymmetry and asset specificity do not. Different legal and regulatory constraints will differently shape the structures that businesses in different countries adopt, to be sure. But at least between the U.S. and Japan, the evidence on crossshareholding arrangements provides no evidence that people themselves respond differently to economic forces. 3 To explore the ties between keiretsu shareholdings and contractual design, I first describe the groups themselves (Section 1). I then advance three propositions.
First, when keiretsu banks trade on group-member stock, they sometimes (not always) trade on inside information (Section 2). If U.S. banks do not do the same, it is only because they cannot legally hold stock. Second, when manufacturers and suppliers exchange stock holdings, they seem to be protecting relation-specific investments (Section 3). If U.S. firms do not do the same, it is often because they have brought their suppliers entirely in-house --as GM famously did with Fisher Body in 1926. Last, the higher crossholdings before World War II reflected the role that the wealthy families at the center of the groups played as venture capitalists (Section 4). Keiretsu firms no longer buy such large equity stakes, but only because the wealthy families at their core disappeared in the wake of World War II.
3 I do not claim to disprove the influence of culture, history, or path-dependence. Instead, I claim only that several prominent aspects of the cross-shareholding patterns (patterns that many had argued were explicable only through culture or history) are equally consistent with rational economizing behavior in the face of well-known problems of contractual design.
1. Introduction: 4 1.1. The keiretsu.
The keiretsu are a diverse lot. Depending on the definition used, observers offer widely varied lists of these extremely varied firms (see Sheard, 1996a : 23 for a taxonomy). Most everyone lists six central groups: the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuji (Fuyo), Daiichi-Kangyo Bank (DKB), and Sanwa.
Each of these groups maintains a list of formal members, and the presidents of those member firms regularly meet for lunch (reflecting the day they meet, the Mitsubishi group calls itself simply "The Friday Group").
Typically, the groups include 20-odd members --from 45 at DKB to 19 at Sumitomo. They cross a wide range of industry lines. The Mitsui group includes two banks, for example, two insurance companies, a trading company, a construction firm, a paper company, an oil company, a steel company, Toshiba, Toyota, and even a real estate firm.
Many observers also use "keiretsu" to refer to larger, looser networks of firms. Often they point to the groups of assemblers, distributors and suppliers in the automobile industry. Toyota is a formal member of the Mitsui keiretsu.
Nonetheless, observers commonly also refer to the Honda, Toyota, and Nissan networks as independent keiretsu. To distinguish these intra-industry groups from the diversified groups like the Mitsui, they typically call the former "vertical" keiretsu and the latter "horizontal."
1.2. The shareholdings.
Keiretsu members often do invest in each other. Note, however, three qualifications about the horizontal keiretsu. First, the cross-shareholdings are often quite small. Where some scholars place keiretsu crossholdings at upwards of 70 percent, 5 among the six core groups the intra-group cross-shareholding (the mean of the amount of any firm's shares held by all other group members combined) instead averages 18 percent. It ranges from a low of 11.7 percent among the 45 DKB group firms to a high of 27.5 percent among the 26 Mitsubishi firms. In fact, reciprocal investments appear in 95.
Furthermore, when these Mitsui firms invest in each other, they invest close to the same amount of funds. In a fifth of the reciprocal shareholdings, the economic value of the smaller 5 Gerlach (1992: 74) quotes sources putting the percentage of shares held by "stable" shareholders at 70 percent. Although he does not refer to this as the keiretsu cross-holidng figure, he does elsewhere characterize the keiretsu as providing group members with "a stable core of long-term shareholders" (id., 4-5). Other observers have been less careful, and conflated the 70 percent figure with keiretsu cross-holdings. In fact, the 70 percent figure simply reflects the percentage of stock held by corporations rather than individuals. investment was within 25 percent of the larger. In over half, it was within 50 percent.
Third, within each keiretsu, several financial firms and a few other outlyers own most of the cross-held stock. Whether a given investment is large or small obviously depends on the benchmark --and perhaps even these shareholdings will strike some readers as large. Note, however, that for most of the post-war years, for regulatory reasons Japan had no substantial bond market, no commercial paper market, and extremely low bank deposit interest rates (Ramseyer, 1994; Litt, et al., 1990) . Given the investment opportunities available, these corporate shareholdings become less mysterious than they might otherwise seem.
2. The Financial Firms 9 2.1. Why they hold.
One reason banks hold stock in their debtors seems straightforward: to constrain moral hazard. Once a firm borrows money, it has an incentive to raise the risk level on the projects it undertakes. By holding a large share of a borrower's voting stock, Japanese banks mitigate this problem. Nineteenthcentury U.S. banks mitigated moral hazard by loaning primarily to insiders (e.g.,directors) over whom they had other formal and hard to see how shareholdings on this order could be "devices to entrench management," as claimed by Morck & Nakamura (forthcoming: 3) . 9 Although the discussion that follows takes a different tack from the extensive literature on Japanese "main banks" (see generally Aoki & Patrick, 1994) , note that it does suggest an answer to a long-standing problem in the main bank literature: why would any bank want to become a main bank? According to the literature, the main bank seems to bear all the cost of monitoring debtors, but without earning a return for informal controls (Lamoreaux, 1991) . Modern U.S. banks neither buy stock nor limit loans to insiders --but only because the law prevents them from buying stock and their sheer size prevents them from lending only to directors. To mitigate moral hazard, they negotiate elaborate contractual limits on debtor discretion instead (Smith & Warner, 1979) .
Although Japanese antitrust law stops banks from holding more than 5 percent of any debtors' stock (Antimonopoly Act, Law
No. 54 of 1947, § 11), keiretsu banks still place among their debtors' largest shareholders. Obviously, a 5 percent interest will not give a bank legal control over its debtor. As Bernard Black (1992: 815-16 ) has pointed out, however, it does give a shareholder both the means and the incentive to assemble a shareholder coalition large enough to influence managerial direction when necessary. In essence, a 5 percent stake helps make credible a shareholder's threat to intervene if the managers perform at sub-standard levels. 10 Those commentators who insist that Japanese crossholdings serve primarily a culturally embedded symbolic role usually argue that the crossheld shares reflect and cement the trades between the two firms (e.g., Gerlach, 1992: 76-77; 1989: 157) . That reflective symbolism, they imply, stems from the way changes in crossholdings correlate with changes in the underlying trades.
In fact, for the keiretsu banks, shareholding changes and debtlevel changes apparently show no such correlation. Granted, doing so (see McKenzie, 1998: 168; Sheard, 1996b: 134-35) . Insider trading presents a partial answer to that puzzle. 10 I do not claim that this is the only way Japanese banks mitigate moral hazard. The debt contract itself obviously provides additional constraint. The extent to which oerlapping boards among the keiretsu firms and the regular presidents' meetings also constrain moral hazard is, however, something I do not try to measure here. keiretsu banks do hold a large block of debtor stock. Once they hold enough stock to mitigate debtor moral hazard (or hit the legal limit), however, the stockholding levels do not track debt levels. With the Sakura bank (the main Mitsui bank) and the Mitsui group members, for example, the correlation between shareholding changes and debt level changes during 1986-1994 was a mere 0.011.
Why they trade.
a. Introduction. --If the need to mitigate moral hazard explains why banks hold stock, it does not explain why they sometimes trade that stock. Although (as noted above) they do not trade in a way that correlates with changes in debt levels, they do trade. Take the intra-group shareholdings at the six keiretsu banks from 1986 to 1994. During those years, the banks shifted shareholding levels at a firm about 38 percent of the time (541 of the 1432 firm-years involved). In the years with such shifts, the change averaged 13.8 percent.
Consider, therefore, a straightforward explanation: banks trade in debtor stock when they learn undisclosed information in the course of monitoring their loans. 11 Because banks regularly monitor debtors, they sometimes have access to more accurate and timely information than other firms. Based on that information, they could potentially trade and profit. If they did, the debtor shareholders would suffer no loss from this. Given inter-bank 11 Insider trading has been illegal during most of the post-war years, but public enforcement has been weak. See Ramseyer & Nakazato (1998: 115) .
The absence of a well-organized options market in Japan meant that for most of the post-war period insider trading would generally have had to take the form of direct trades in equity.
competition, these stock market gains would instead lead to offsetting cuts in the interest banks charge.
To test this insider-trading hypothesis, one would ideally examine stock prices immediately before and shortly after a bank traded. Unfortunately, although I know the stocks a bank owned each March (the end of each fiscal year), I do not know when during the year it traded on any stock. As a cruder alternative, therefore, I test whether the direction and magnitude of a bank's trades during any given year contains information that helps explain the direction of stock price movements during that year The regression is ordinary least squares. The table gives the coefficient, followed by the tstatistic.
The sample includes all Sakura Bank shareholdings in the stock of the core Mitsui keiretsu members from 1986 to 1994. In fact, this counter-hypothesis does not work. To test it, in equations II and IV I add changes in the Sakura Bank's outstanding loans at a firm (BkLoanDec). As Table 1 The sample takes all the shareholdings of the six central keiretsu banks in the core member firms in all years from 1986 through 1994 (1432 firm years). It then excludes those firmyears in which the bank's shareholding in a member firm did not change (yielding a net 541 firm years). The Mitsui figures in Table 1 Note, however, that many of the banks may have engaged so heavily in accounting-driven trades that they fogged the evidence of insider trading. As in most modern countries, the Japanese government regulates banks with a heavy hand and does so with a focus on accounting measures. In response, as the financial press has reported regularly over the past several years, many banks have aggressively liquidated their assets in order to generate gains to hide bad debts. Perhaps, then, those accounting-driven trades simply cloud the data too heavily to obtain significant results over the full sample. 13 3. Supplier-Manufacturer Cross-holdings 3.1. The theory.
Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe (1993) recently hypothesized that keiretsu firms may be exchanging stock to mitigate contractual opportunism by obtaining control of their trading partners.
Drawing on work by Oliver Williamson (1979) and Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian (1978) , they argue that firms use the crossholdings to reduce the risk that their partners cheat. If they trade only standard market goods, they need not worry, of course. If they trade idiosyncratic goods, however, they will need to invest in skills, knowledge, and equipment that 12 To capture firm-specific effects, I also reran the regressions with separate dummy variables for each firm and year. The coefficient on BkInvDec remained positive but statistically insignificant. 13 Although Japanese banks have begun to disclose their bad debt histories, as of late 1998 the public data (regularly reproduced in the are specific to the contract. After the investment --after the Williamsonian "fundamental transformation" --they will be locked in to a bilateral monopoly and vulnerable to being held up by their partner (Alchian & Woodward, 1988) . Before making the investment, therefore, they may choose to negotiate control over their partner. Before doing so in Japan, suggest Gilson and Roe, they negotiate such control through keiretsu crossholdings.
In part, firms can mitigate these risks through long-term contracts. Before A builds a machine dedicated to products it sells B, it can obtain from B a promise to buy the goods for many
years. Yet such contracts introduce a host of problems all their own (Tirole, 1988: 27-29; Joskow, 1985a Joskow, , 1985b . Often, therefore, A will instead buy a controlling interest in B, B will buy a controlling interest in A, or the firms will merge.
The evidence from Japan.
Given the small size of the cross-holdings involved (other than by financial firms), the Gilson & Roe hypothesis probably has little to do with the shareholdings among the core horizontal keiretsu. One cannot protect relation-specific investments when one's investment does not even put one among one's contracting partner's top 20 shareholders. Within the automobile industry, however, the theory fits to a tee. 14 Firms in the automobile industry invest almost exactly as the Gilson-Roe theory predicts. Toyota, for example, assembles its standard-sized cars through Toyota Body (Toyota shatai). In financial press) seemed too heavily aggregated (primarily only cumulative totals) to use to disentangle the stock trading by the banks. it, Toyota owns 44 percent and with its affiliates 52 percent. Toyota could also, hypothetically, protect itself by retaining title to the specific asset. This is less workable when the asset is integrated into the subsidiary's factory --or, indeed, is the factory itself.
Body --and consistent with the theory, the coefficient on the sectoral dummy BODY is positive and statistically significant: manufacturing firms are likely to own large blocks of shares in their coach assemblers. None of the other sectoral dummies is significant. Presumably, these sectors involve less asset specificity. 17 To study the relation between asset specificity and firm shareholdings more directly, I looked for measures of relationship-specific investments. Toward that end, I
hypothesize that the percentage of sales from a supplier to a automobile manufacturer will correlate (however imperfectly) with the size of relationship-specific investments involved in the trade. In general, a manufactuer will prefer to buy its supplies from multiple vendors (a common practice in the Japanese automobile industry; Asanuma, 1989: 4; Miwa, 1996: 232) . First, doing so protects the manufacturer from finding its production held up by problems at any one firm. Second, the competition among the suppliers introduces all the benefits usually associted with market transactions: lower costs, faster product innovation, and less opportunism. Precisely because it too prefers to avoid the risk that its sales will be held up by problems at any manufacturer, suppliers will prefer to diversify their sales among multiple manufacturers (again, a common practice in Japan; Miwa, 1996: 16-17, 71-72 investments. When production involves such model-specific investments, firms face incentives to reduce their diversification. All else equal, moreover, if a manufacturer buys an item from fewer suppliers, then those suppliers will in turn sell a higher percentage of their output to that manufacturer. The correlation is imperfect to be sure, but the resulting intuition is simple: the larger the relationshipspecific investment needed to produce an item, the fewer the suppliers from which the manufacturer will buy it and the bigger the share of a supplier's output the manufactuer will buy.
Tentatively to be sure, the equations in Table 3 (Sloan, 1963: 15) . It gained no greater control by merging it into GM in 1926. Why did it do so? More generally, if Japanese firms can deal with the problems posed by asset specificity through controlling interests, why do U.S. firms seem to think they need 100 percent? 19 One hypothesis (albeit one I do not purport to test here) goes to corporate law. Despite the formal similarity between U.S. and Japanese corporate law, U.S. courts seem more aggressively to try to protect minority shareholders. the costs parents incur by trading idiosyncratic goods with less-than-fully-owned subsidiaries. Dependent variable: LEADSH% --the percentage of stock in the firm held by the lead purchaser within the automobile industry of the firm's products.
BUYER%: The percentage of the firm's products bought by the lead purchaser within the automobile industry of the firm's products.
SALES: The firm's (i.e., the subcontracter's) total sales, in ¥ billion.
Other notes: The sample consists of all firms in the Kigyo keiretsu soran with data on customers. The regression is ordinary least squares. The table gives the coefficient, followed by the t-statistic. Consider a final puzzle, one raised by the crossshareholding patterns among the pre-war predecessors to the keiretsu (known as the zaibatsu). Where the modern keiretsu maintain mean cross-holdings of 10-20 percent, their pre-war predecessors maintained crossholdings that averaged 50-60 percent (Takahashi, 1930; Mochikabu, 1951) . That mean, moreover, disguised a large fraction of firms owned entirely (or nearly entirely) by other members of the group.
The logic to these higher pre-war levels lies in the way the rich families at the core of the zaibatsu invested in high-risk modern ventures. Like venture capital firms (or perhaps, more precisely, KKR-style-turnaround specialists) today, they heaviliy invested in high-risk technologies. They were rich --each family (such as the Mitsui) included a large number of very wealthy individuals. Rather than invest separately, these family members pooled their wealth in a family partnership. They then hired professional managers from outside the family to invest that pooled wealth in industrial ventures.
Although historians sometimes dismiss them as "conservative," the zaibatsu families invested heavily in new and (within Japan) untried technologies. Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson (1998) describe venture capital firms as those that invest in "high-growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms that need capital to finance product development or growth ...." So too the pre-war zaibatsu.
To take new and untried technology to the market, the zaibatsu families supplied extensive and expensive technical and managerial expertise (again as modern venture capital firms often do --see Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995 Gompers, : 1464 . Because they did so single-handedly, they had little incentive to share the returns with anyone else. Because they provided most of the skills that mattered, they demanded near-total equity stakes.
Granted, modern venture capitalists use securities other than stock to adjust the relative incentives of the venture capitalists and the startup's managers. Typically, for example, venture capital firms today will prefer convertible securities for the advantages they offer in solving the various agency and informational problems the new venture presents (see Gompers, 1998 21 Obviously, there were exceptions. The zaibatsu invested heavily in some industries where they took only modest fractional interests. Although both the Mitsubishi and the Mitsui invested in railroads, for instance, they usually bought only minor equity percentages (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1995: 127) . Although the Mitsui dominated the giant Kanebo cotton spinning firm, as of the late 1920s the Mitsui held less than 10 percent of Kanebo stock (id., at 146).
MIT-trained engineer named Takuma Dan. Dan bought lavishly expensive western technology. In the process, he cost the Mitsui huge amounts of money, but it was money well spent. Within a few years Miike earned huge returns: profits rose from ¥80,782 in 1889 to ¥310,310 for the second half of 1893, to ¥733,704 in the second half of 1908. 22 Once they had brought their firms to success, the zaibatsu firms often cashed in some of their investment. Once the Mitsui had transformed Miike into a profitable modern mine, it earned only market returns on Miike's shadow price. So long as it had more profitable places to park its money, it had an obvious incentive to sell some of its Miike interest. It did just that.
In 1933 it sold two Miike subsidiaries, and by 1945 had sold a third of Mitsui Mining itself. 23 Among the zaibatsu, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi most aggressively sold the firms they had built. Unfortunately, we lack extensive, annually updated data on pre-war cross-holdings.
We do, however, have surveys from 1928 and 1945. Based on that data, Table 4 compares the Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests in several firms. The story is simple: after introducing sophisticated modern methods and earning huge returns for that risk, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi sold the stock at market prices.
Although the zaibatsu owned 50-60 percent interests in some firms, in many they owned 100 percent; in others they owned small portfolio interests. In effect, the average spanned firms at different stages along that chronological process: new firms still owned 100 percent by the zaibatsu, firms the zaibatsu had recently transformed into modern successes, and firms they had long-ago transformed and partially sold to the public.
The keiretsu no longer play the venture-capitalist function that the pre-war zaibatsu played, but only because the occupation-era legal reforms destroyed the extraordinarily wealthy families at their core. After the war, the U.S.-controlled occupation officers --rightly or wrongly --placed much of the blame for Japanese aggression on the largest and most visible firms in the economy. Most particularly, they blamed the zaibatsu families like Mitsui, the Sumitomo, and the Iwasaki (who ran the Mitsubishi group). In order to "democratize" the economy, they ordered those families to sell off their shares.
Given the state of the stock market, by ordering the families to sell their shares they effectively dispossessed them.
The lower contemporary shareholding levels follow straightforwardly. The zaibatsu families held large interests because they were heavily involved in transforming hightechnology ventures. Investing most of the effort, they demanded most of the returns. With the wealthy families gone, the postwar keiretsu no longer play that role. No longer playing such a role, they no longer take large equity stakes in affiliated ventures. 24 
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the common economic logic, corporate shareholding patterns in the U.S. and Japan look very different.
Despite those apparent differences, however, the analytic forces behind the shareholdings in Japan track the forces behind them here. To illustrate this point, I suggest three principal hypotheses. First,the modern keiretsu banks invest in the stock of their debtors to mitigate debtor moral hazard. They occasionally trade in the stock because in monitoring those debtors they obtain material nonpublic information. The nonRamseyer: Page 31 financial keiretsu firms invest in each other only at trivial levels. Second, firms in the same industry invest in each other when relationship-specific investments make contractual opportunism a problem. Last, the zaibatsu families held large interests in firms before the war because they were venture capital financeers. As such, they behaved much the way their silicon valley peers behave today.
